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1Why Do Governments Privatize?
Abstract
Drawing on a unique data set we collected in 1998 and 2000, this paper examines
the determinants of privatization both theoretically and empirically. Our theoretical
model explicitly considers the role of banks in determining privatization. We ﬁnd that
improved human capital and incentives of bank managers or/and deteriorating bank
liquidity constraint lead to privatization. We also analyze the conditions under which
shutdown might be preferred as a method to divest of government-owned ﬁrms. We
ﬁnd empirical evidence that is consistent with our model’s predictions.
Geographic Area : China
Keywords : Privatization, Township and Village Enterprises, Financial Institutions
JEL Classiﬁcation: G32, G34, L32, L33, P20, P311 Introduction
Through the ﬁrst decade and a half of economic reform in China, township and village owned
enterprises (TVEs) were the most dynamic sector of the economy. Over this period, real
growth in these enterprises averaged more than twenty percent annually. By the early 1990s,
these local government-owned enterprises totaled more than 1.25 million, and employed 135.1
million individuals, an increase of more than 100 million since 1980. The contrast with the
performance of state-owned enterprises over the same period is fairly stark. Estimates suggest
that the rate of growth in output and productivity in SOEs was only about half of that in
the TVEs (Jeﬀerson and Rawski, 1994).
The rapid rise of TVEs has been linked to the imperfect institutional environment of the
period. In the 1980s private ﬁrms were heavily regulated and private property was not well
protected. In addition, township governments enjoyed preferential access to newly emerging
product and input markets, while local government leaders had superior human capital in
operating ﬁrms (Byrd and Lin, 1990; Weitzman and Xu, 1994; Che and Qian, 1998b; Chen
and Rozelle, 1999; Oi, 1999; Whiting, 2001). China’s state-owned banks, especially the rural
branches of the Agricultural Bank of China and the Rural Credit Cooperatives, also ﬁgured
prominently in the fast growth of TVEs. During this period, township-owned ﬁrms typically
had better access to loans from these institutions and usually on soft terms (Che and Qian,
1998a).
However, in the early 1990s, these same ﬁrms, which had fueled such striking growth
and had been argued by some observers to be the ‘appropriate’ ownership form in China,
began to be privatized (Oi, 1999; Whiting, 2001; Li and Rozelle, 2003). This followed a
fundamental shift in central government policy that eﬀectively allowed privatization as part
of a program of enterprise restructuring, or zhuanzhi. In its implementation, this policy
reﬂected the high degree of decentralization prevalent in China: Each level of government,
e.g., province, municipality, county, township and village, was given discretion as to how to
interpret and carry out this policy.
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Li et al., 2000; Li, 2003), their major argument being that local governments choose to pri-
vatize TVEs because changes in the institutional environment altered the beneﬁts and costs
of government ownership. Property right reform, on the one hand, made government owner-
ship less important in protecting property rights (Li and Rozelle, 2003). Market development
and an increase in market competitiveness, on the other hand, reduced the advantages of
government ownership, and encouraged leaders to voluntarily privatize their ﬁrms (Li et al.,
2000; Li, 2003). Although retaining ownership provides a number of advantages to local
government leaders, through the sale of the ﬁrm to its manager, a leader may exchange
government control for revenue from the sale.
Largely overlooked in the literature on privatization is the general health and reforms of
the banking sector. The accumulation of a huge amount of non-performing loans in China’s
banking system forced many bank branches to curtail lending to TVEs, which were usually
less proﬁtable than private ﬁrms. Bank reform dating from the early 1990s in turn improved
the incentives and human capital of bank managers, and hardened the budget constraint of
township governments. Starting in 1994, government-owned ﬁrms were required to provide
“hard” collateral for all loans. Equally important, bank reform helped to insulate local banks
from the inﬂuence of local leaders by recentralizing a signiﬁcant part of the lending rights
from township bank branches to upper level branches. This made it easier for local banks
to decline loan applications from TVEs since the upper-level bank managers are superior
in the political hierarchy to township government leaders. An important feature regarding
the bank health and reforms is that there is a great heterogeneity across bank branches in
China, and it is this heterogeneity that we link to privatization in this paper.
The ﬁnancial health and reforms of banks aﬀect the likelihood that a leader privatizes
ﬁrms in two ways.1 First, analogous to the changes occurring in other market forces, bank
health and reforms alter the returns to government ownership and encourage privatization.
For example, when the ﬁrm’s budget becomes harder, leaders are more responsible for bank
2loans and thus, may ﬁnd retaining a township enterprise (TE) less valuable compared to the
beneﬁts received from selling the ﬁrm. Second, uniquely, the ﬁnancial health and reforms of
banks may force leaders to privatize. When the bank refuses to lend to TEs either because
the bank cares more about proﬁtability or because it has serious liquidity constraints, TEs
become less valuable to the leader, and the leader is forced (by the bank) to privatize.
In this paper, we develop a simple theoretical model that allows the bank to play an
active role in privatization. In our model, privatization may occur when the bank is willing
to lend to a government-owned ﬁrm but the leader ﬁnds that privatization maximizes her
utility. Privatization could also occur when the bank is unwilling to lend to a government-
owned ﬁrm but will lend to a more proﬁtable private ﬁrm. Our comparative static results
show that the likelihood of privatization increases with the hardness of the leader’s budget
constraint, the enterprise manager’s human capital and the bank manager’s human capital,
but it decreases with the leader’s perks from government ownership and human capital. We
also ﬁnd that the bank’s proﬁt incentives and liquidity constraint have positive eﬀects on
privatization, and these eﬀects decrease with the hardness of the leader’s budget constraint.
By drawing on unique data we collected on ﬁrms and banks in China, we test the
above theoretical predictions. The data cover a sample of more than 600 ﬁrms in nearly
60 townships in the two provinces of Jiangsu and Zhejiang, and show a great deal of het-
erogeneity in both privatization and bank reforms. We ﬁnd that the heterogeneity in bank
characteristics and other institutional variables are correlated with privatization in the way
that our model predicts. We have conﬁdence that the causation is more likely to be running
from bank heterogeneity to privatization because our empirical tests make use of a natural
experiment. The relaxation of central government restrictions on enterprise privatization in
1994 essentially allowed all township governments to re-evaluate the returns to government
ownership. Since privatization was largely prohibited before 1993, it is hard to make a valid
argument of reverse causality, i.e., privatization aﬀects bank reforms.
We also analyze the likelihood of a ﬁrm being shut down. Our model predicts that
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with the ﬁrm’s proﬁtability, the leader’s human capital, the manager’s human capital, the
bank’s human capital, the leader’s perks and the bank’s perks. Moreover, it may increase or
decrease with the leader’s budget constraint and the bank’s proﬁt incentive. Our empirical
ﬁndings in general support these predictions.
This paper contributes to the existing literature on privatization (Megginson and Net-
ter, 2001) and transition in several ways. First, we explicitly consider the role of banks in
determining privatization, and ﬁnd both theoretically and empirically that improved human
capital and incentives of bank managers or/and deteriorating bank liquidity constraint lead
to privatization. This is in contrast to the literature, which generally sees causality running
from privatization to changes in bank incentives and budget hardness; in other words, priva-
tization is viewed as critical to improving bank incentives and hardening budget constraints
of ﬁrms (Roland, 2000).2 As a potential policy implication, our ﬁndings suggest that re-
forms that alter the human capital, incentives and control rights in ﬁnancial institutions can
play an important role in encouraging enterprises to restructure and to change ownership.
Second, the unique survey data allow us to study shutdown behavior in a transition context,
and in particular ﬁrm shutdown driven by bank reforms.
Our paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we provide additional background
on local governments, ﬁrms and ﬁnancial institutions. In section 3, we develop a simple
model that sketches out the nature of the interaction between local agents, and generates
hypotheses regarding the determinants of privatization and shutdown. In section 4, we
describe our data. In section 5, we empirically test the theoretical predictions. Section 6
concludes.
2 Township Governments, Firms and Banks
An understanding of the institutional environment in which the township government leader,
ﬁrm managers and banks interact with each other is essential to explaining why governments
4privatize. To this end, we begin by describing these institutions, and how their evolution
explains both the sudden rise and dramatic decline of township and village enterprises.
The township represents the lowest level of government in the state administrative
hierarchy in China. A typical township has a population of 50,000, ﬁfteen to twenty percent
of which resides in the township center, and the rest in outlying villages. Township leadership
is made up of the township party-secretary, the township head, and the director of the
township enterprise committee, all of who are appointed by higher-level (or county-level)
party/government authorities. Township leaders are evaluated on the basis of their ability to
fulﬁll targets set by higher-level authorities, one of the most important of which is economic
development, especially the development of local enterprises. Other targets include family
planning, tax remission, safety etc. Bonuses and career prospects are tied to fulﬁlling these
targets (Oi, 1999; Whiting, 2001). To generate ﬁscal revenues and fulﬁll their growth targets,
township governments established many township-owned enterprises (TEs) in the ﬁrst decade
of the post-1978 reform. TEs, together with village enterprises (VEs) that were established
by village cadres, are commonly referred to as township and village enterprises (TVEs).
Through the ﬁrst decade and a half of economic reform in China, TVEs were the
most important source of economic growth in rural China (Che and Qian, 1998b; Chen and
Rozelle, 1999; Oi, 1999). Township leaders beneﬁted from the TVEs in a number of ways.
Since higher levels of government directly tie cadre bonuses and promotion to enterprise
development and economic growth, township leaders proﬁt directly from their expansion
and growth (Manion, 1985; O’Brien and Li, 1999; Whiting, 2001; Li and Zhou, 2004). They
also beneﬁt from the control they exercise over these ﬁrms’ assets, proﬁts, and cash ﬂow,
because of the thin line that often separates government leaders and these ﬁrms. In TEs,
enterprise management is overseen by the Township Economic Commission, which is often
headed up directly by the Township Party Secretary. Firm resources can be diverted and
used to support other local purposes, including paying cadre salaries and providing jobs for
local residents. Leaders may also derive “private” perks from these ﬁrms, including access to
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this capacity to extract resources and rents from TEs is a function of their size, proﬁtability,
and cash ﬂow (Shleifer and Vishny, 1994).
Several alternative explanations have been oﬀered for the sudden rise of TVEs. One
school links the success of TVEs to market failure. Chang and Wang (1994) and Li (1996),
for example, argue that the success of TVEs is the result of local government monopolistic
control over input and product markets. Related, government leaders possessed the hu-
man capital that was appropriate to running enterprises in such an environment (Chen and
Rozelle, 1999). Both the market failure and human capital theories suggest that government
ownership (i.e., TVEs) was superior to private ownership in this period. A third school
links local government ownership to state failure. When the state cannot commit to act
non-predatorily against private ﬁrms, local government ownership best protects local ﬁrms’
property rights (Qian and Weingast, 1997; Che and Qian, 1998a, b).
China’s state-owned banks have also played a very important role in the fast growth
of TVEs. Throughout this period, the township branches of two ﬁnancial institutions, the
Agricultural Bank of China (ABC) and Rural Credit Cooperatives (RCC), largely serviced
rural China. Both institutions are found in most townships. Combined, they held nearly
eighty percent of all rural deposits and were the source of an equal percentage of loans,
nearly half of which went to township and village enterprises (Park et al., 1997).3
At the outset of economic reform, these ﬁnancial institutions were like other state-
owned enterprises and were subject to centralized management and economic planning. The
government provided no incentives to motivate bank managers and staﬀ, and their pay was
pre-determined and thus independent of performance. Bank managers also had no formal
training, and lacked the skills either to screen loan applicants or monitor ﬁrms after loans
were made. Even more serious, loans to government-owned ﬁrms were soft. Although TVEs
typically faced much harder budget constraints than state-owned enterprises (SOEs), local
governments could still use their political power to inﬂuence local banks’ lending decisions
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in the appointment of township branch bank managers, and a variety of perks that govern-
ment leaders were able to extend to bank managers. Oﬃcially, township branch managers
were appointed by higher level bank oﬃcials. When projects were unsuccessful, loans to
township-owned ﬁrms that were guaranteed by the township government (or other township-
owned ﬁrms) were typically rolled over, and without penalty. A combination of the lack of
incentives and skills of bank managers, and the nature of the government-bank relationship
contributed to the signiﬁcant accumulation of non-performing loans, and jeopardized the
liquidity of the banking system.
To summarize, the rise of TVEs in the 1980s and early 1990s occurred in an institu-
tional environment in which product and input markets were imperfect, and property rights
were not well protected. As well, banks were typically more willing to lend to TVEs than
private ﬁrms and on softer terms (Brandt and Li, 2003). Despite agency costs of govern-
ment ownership caused by the separation of ownership and control, and ﬁrm goals other
than proﬁt maximization, a case can be made that government ownership and ﬁrms ran by
government leaders could be optimal (Che and Qian, 1998a; Chen and Rozelle, 1999).
The extraordinary performance in the 1980s and early 1990s of China’s TVEs did not
prevent these ﬁrms from being privatized in large numbers beginning in the mid 1990s.
According to our recent survey in China’s Lower Yangtse Delta region, which we discuss
in more detail below, more than half of all enterprises owned by township governments in
1994 had been partially or completely privatized by the end of 1997. Oi (1999) and Whiting
(2001) also document large privatization eﬀorts by local governments.
This privatization has been linked to changes in the institutional environment, which
altered the beneﬁts and costs of government ownership (Li et al., 2000; Li, 2003). Property
rights reform, on the one hand, made government ownership less important in protecting
property rights. Market development and an increase in market competitiveness also reduced
the advantages of government-ownership, and encouraged leaders to choose voluntarily to
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to leaders, through the sale of the ﬁrm to its manager, a leader may exchange government
control for revenue from the sale.
Largely overlooked in the decision to privatize is bank reform. Bank reform brought
major changes to all state-owned commercial banks, such as the ABCs, and also to the
RCCs. First, as a major reform initiative to improve the performance of state-owned banks,
the government initiated a bonus system in the early 1990s. The bank manager’s year-
end bonuses were tied to their performance in attracting deposits, reducing non-performing
loans, and increasing bank proﬁts. Second, many better-educated and more competent
employees were promoted to branch managers. This contributed to improved screening of
loan applications and to an increase in loan repayment rates through better project selection
by ﬁrms. Third, starting from 1994, township-owned ﬁrms, as well as other ownership types,
were required to provide “hard” collateral, e.g. bank deposits, buildings, machinery, etc, for
their loans. This new collateral requirement helped to harden the budget constraints of the
TEs. The new bank reform has also made the banks more willing to lend to private ﬁrms
(Brandt and Li, 2003), which are usually more proﬁtable. Finally, banks are more likely
to decline loan applications from TEs. Reforms have recentralized a signiﬁcant part of the
lending rights from township branches to the upper (or county) level. Since the county bank
managers are superior in the political hierarchy relative to township government leaders, it
is easier for them to say “no” to township leaders. Moreover, the serious liquidity constraint
of many bank branches has forced them to decline loan applications from TEs, which are
likely to have unproﬁtable projects.
An important feature of the bank reform, like that of any other reforms in China,
is that it has not been uniform across localities. In fact, there remains a great deal of
heterogeneity across localities in terms of bank incentives, human capital and the hardness
of the budget constraint (Brandt and Li, 2003). Moreover, for historical reasons, banks also
diﬀer in the size of non-performing loans across ﬁnancial institutions. The existence of such
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the heterogeneity of these bank characteristics aﬀects the decisions of township leaders on
privatization and shutdown. We then empirically test these theoretical predictions that link
bank heterogeneity to privatization and shutdown decisions in Section 5.
3 A Heuristic Model
We consider a very simple environment in which three risk-neutral players interact: a gov-
ernment (township) leader, an enterprise manager and a bank. The leader has one township
enterprise that she can choose whether to retain, to privatize, or to shut down. We denote
a retained township enterprise as TE and a privatized enterprise as PE.
3.1 A Township Enterprise
If the leader retains the ﬁrm, she will enjoy its proﬁts and receive some perks or other
beneﬁts (αTE) from owning the ﬁrm. An operating ﬁrm can borrow at cost R from the bank
to undertake a potentially proﬁtable project, where R is set administratively by higher-level
government regulation and is unaﬀected by the parties modeled in this paper. We also
assume that the size of the loan is ﬁxed. All players are uncertain as to whether this ﬁrm
(project) will be proﬁtable (with a proﬁt π > R) or not (with zero proﬁt). However, the ﬁrm
manager can directly aﬀect this probability of success, p(e), through his eﬀort choice, e. For
simplicity, we set p(e) = e. When the project succeeds, the ﬁrm pays R to the bank; when
the project fails, the bank will seize the amount δTER, where δTE < 1. The variable δTE
serves to measure the hardness of the budget constraint for a TE, but could alternatively
be interpreted as the amount of ﬁrm collateral. Thus, the TE’s expected gross proﬁt is
e(π − R) + (1 − e)(−δTER).
There are two costs for the government leader in operating the ﬁrm: the manager’s
wage w = C(H,h,e) + w, which covers the manager’s reservation utility ¯ w and his cost of
eﬀort C(H,h,e), and the cost of monitoring the manager M(g,e).4 C(H,h,e) is increasing
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decreasing in the human capital of the bank manager h. This captures in a simple way that
a skilled bank manager may be able to assist the ﬁrm in realizing proﬁtable projects. The
leader must also incur a monitoring cost M(e,g) to induce eﬀort from the manager. This
monitoring cost increases with eﬀort e, but decreases with the leader’s human capital g.
Thus, the leader’s utility is e(π − R) + (1 − e)(−δTER) − ¯ w − C(H,h,e) − M(g,e) + αTE.
The value of the ﬁrm to the government ultimately depends on the bank’s lending
behavior. If a project is not ﬁnanced, the ﬁrm will not be retained. We restrict the bank to
making a loan of ﬁxed size. The bank is willing to lend as long as its participation constraint
holds (or equivalently, its total expected rents from lending are positive). The bank’s return
from lending to a TE is given by WTE ≡ γ[eR + (1 − e)(δTER − (1 − δTE)f(R,l))] + αB.
The bank will lend if this is positive. The parameter γ measures the bank manager’s proﬁt
incentive, while αB measures the non-proﬁt incentive or perks that the bank manager may
enjoy from having a good relationship with the township leader.5 The function f(l) is an
increasing, convex liquidity cost of lending money, where l is the current stock of bad loans.
Thus, as a ﬁrm owner, and conditional upon receiving bank ﬁnance, the leader’s opti-
mization problem is
max
e e(π − R) + (1 − e)(−δTER) − ¯ w − C(H,h,e) − M(g,e) + αTE
This yields a ﬁrst order condition:







This implicitly deﬁnes the optimal level of managerial eﬀort, and thus, the value to the
leader of retaining the ﬁrm, V ∗
TE. If the bank is not willing to lend, the ﬁrm has no value
and will not be retained as a TE. Thus, the value of a TE, VTE = V ∗
TE if the bank lends;
and VTE = 0 otherwise.
103.2 A Private Firm
We focus on privatization through the sale of the ﬁrm to its manager, since this is the
only type that is empirically relevant. The bank is willing to lend to the PE if WPE ≡
γ[eR + (1 − e)(δPER − (1 − δPE)f(R,l))] ≥ 0. No manager would ever buy a ﬁrm if this
condition does not hold, since such a ﬁrm would have no value to him. As the owner, the
manager’s objective is
max
e e(π − R) + (1 − e)(−δPER) − C(H,h,e),
where δPE measures the budget hardness for a PE. The optimal eﬀort choice is given by




which implicitly deﬁnes the value of a PE, ˆ VPE. We deﬁne the net value of a ﬁrm V ∗
PE as
V ∗
PE ≡ ˆ VPE − ¯ w. The value of a PE, VPE = V ∗
PE if the bank is willing to lend; and VPE = 0
otherwise.
A PE manager undertakes more eﬀort than a TE manager if the hardness of the budget
constraint is the same for the two types of ﬁrms (δTE = δPE) and all else is equal. This
can be seen from the associated ﬁrst order conditions. Given a government owned ﬁrm
has to monitor its manager, managerial eﬀort is more costly. Consequently, a lower level
of eﬀort will be demanded by a TE. This diﬀerence is magniﬁed since PEs normally have
harder budgets than TEs, i.e., if δTE < δPE. Additional responsibility or loss when a project
fails (higher δ) encourages ﬁrms to induce additional eﬀort in an attempt to reduce the
probability of project failure. As a result of both of these eﬀects, a TE will induce less eﬀort
and therefore will be less likely to succeed than a PE.
3.3 Privatization or Shutdown
The leader compares the value of a TE to the value she receives from the ﬁrm if she privatizes
it at price n. We assume that this price arises from a Nash bargain between the leader and
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the ﬁrm. If a ﬁrm has a negative value for both ownership forms, it will be shut down.
In order to decide whether to privatize or shut down this risky venture, the leader
takes into account that under either ownership structure, the bank will interact with the
ﬁrm, determining whether or not to lend. We assume that the bank’s lending decision is
made prior to any ﬁrm manager’s eﬀort decisions. The timing of the whole game is as
follows: (1) The leader decides to privatize, retain or shut down the ﬁrm; (2) the bank
decides whether or not to lend a ﬁxed amount of loan; (3) the ﬁrm eﬀort decision is made;
and (4) proﬁts are realized and loans are repaid.
We are now ready to address the question that motivated our analysis: Should a leader
privatize or shut down a ﬁrm? What factors make privatization and shutdown relatively
more attractive? Naturally, a leader will compare her utility with a TE to her utility with
a PE. In other words, if the price she gets from the sale of the ﬁrm is higher than the value
to her of the retained ﬁrm, i.e., n > VTE, she will choose to privatize. When will the ﬁrm
manager be willing to buy the ﬁrm? If his value of the ﬁrm exceeds its price, VP > n. So, a
ﬁrm will be privatized if VPE −VTE > 0 and V ∗
PE ≥ 0. The value of VPE −VTE will take the
following values depending on the bank’s lending decision,
VPE − VTE =

   
   
V ∗
PE − V ∗
TE if WPE ≥ 0,WTE ≥ 0;
V ∗
PE if WPE ≥ 0 > WTE;
−V ∗
TE if WTE ≥ 0 > WPE;
0 if WPE < 0,WTE < 0.
First note that when V ∗
PE < 0, privatization is not possible and the leader can only
choose to retain or shut down the ﬁrm. The leader will shut down the ﬁrm voluntarily if
V ∗
TE < 0 and will be forced to shut it down if the bank does not lend to a TE. Since this
case does not generate much insight, we will focus on the case of V ∗
PE ≥ 0 in the following
discussion.
In the following, we examine the factors that aﬀect the likelihood of privatization and
shutdown. We only provide the intuition for these comparative static results in the text
and leave detailed proofs in the Appendix. These comparative static results provide the
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3.3.1 Privatization
When V ∗
PE ≥ 0, privatization may occur in two situations: (1) the bank is willing to lend
to both TEs and PEs (i.e., WPE ≥ 0,WTE ≥ 0) and V ∗
PE − V ∗
TE ≥ 0; and (2) the bank is
only willing to lend to PEs (i.e., WPE ≥ 0 > WTE). In the ﬁrst case, the leader voluntarily
chooses to privatize the ﬁrm. In contrast, in the second case, a ﬁrm is forced to be privatized
because the bank does not lend to a TE. We will consider factors that drive privatization
for both cases.
In case (1), the bank is willing to lend to the ﬁrm regardless of its ownership. Thus,
the likelihood of privatization increases with factors that increase the value of a PE more
than that of a TE, or increases V ∗
PE − V ∗
TE. We consider the following factors.
Budget constraint and perks. Privatization is more likely when a TE faces harder budget
constraints (higher δTE), and/or when the leader derives smaller perks from a TE. When
the leader’s budget constraint becomes harder and/or the perks from owning a ﬁrm becomes
smaller for the leader, the value of a TE decreases and privatization becomes more likely.
Proﬁtability. Privatization is more likely when the ﬁrm is more proﬁtable. Higher proﬁtabil-
ity π increases the value of a ﬁrm for both ownership forms, but it increases the value of a
PE more because a PE is more likely to succeed.
Human capital. The likelihood of privatization increases with both the ﬁrm and bank man-
ager’s human capital, but decreases with the leader’s human capital. Better ﬁrm manager
and bank human capital reduces the cost of eﬀort for both ownership forms, but it will
reduce the cost for a PE more, since PEs have higher eﬀorts. Higher leader human capital
reduces the monitoring cost and increases the value of a TE.
If V ∗
PE − V ∗
TE < 0, which could happen because of large perks from a TE, the leader
is not willing to privatize. However, the bank can force the leader to privatize by lending
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increases with factors that increase the value for the bank from lending to a PE more than
to a TE.6 We focus on two bank characteristics: the bank incentives (γ) and the liquidity
constraint (l). Moreover, we also examine how the likelihood of privatization is aﬀected by
the interaction of these two factors with the hardness of the budget for a TE (δTE).
Bank incentives. Privatization is more likely when banks have better incentives. Since PEs
are more proﬁtable than TEs, bank lending to a PE may be proﬁtable when it is not to a TE
for certain parameter values. In this situation, increasing bank incentives will increase the
bank’s value of lending to a PE, but reduce the value of lending to a TE (because the proﬁt
from lending to a TE is negative). Thus, privatization is more likely with better incentives
for these parameter ranges.
The eﬀect of bank incentives on privatization is decreasing in the hardness of the
leader’s budget constraint. Although more powerful bank incentives make the bank less
willing to lend to an unproﬁtable TE, a harder government budget constraint reduces the
loss of the bank in the case of default and therefore increases the proﬁtability of lending to
a TE, making the negative eﬀect of bank incentives on the bank’s lending to a TE weaker.
Liquidity. When the bank has many bad loans, it is very costly (perhaps prohibitively
diﬃcult) to lend for new projects. It is even more diﬃcult to lend to TEs than PEs because
TEs generally have a lower probability of being proﬁtable. As a result, TEs are more likely
to be shut down. If TEs need to be shut down but PEs do not, privatization will occur.
The eﬀect of bank liquidity on privatization is decreasing in the hardness of the leader’s
budget constraint. Although higher liquidity costs make the bank less willing to lend to a
TE, a harder government leader budget constraint will increase the proﬁtability of lending
to a TE, making the negative eﬀect of bank liquidity on the bank’s lending to a TE weaker.
Hypothesis 1: The likelihood of privatization increases with the hardness of the leader’s budget
constraint, the ﬁrm’s proﬁtability, the manager’s human capital, the bank’s human capital,
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capital; the eﬀect of the bank’s incentives and liquidity constraint on privatization decreases
with the leader’s budget constraint.
3.3.2 Shutdown
When V ∗
PE ≥ 0, shutdown may also happen in two situations: (1) the bank is willing to lend
only to a TE (i.e., WTE ≥ 0 > WPE) and V ∗
TE < 0; and (2) the bank is unwilling to lend to
either ﬁrm type (i.e., WPE < 0,WTE < 0).
The comparative statics regarding shutdown are more straightforward. As discussed
above, shutdown happens either because the bank is not willing to lend (to a TE or PE), or
because the value of a ﬁrm (TE or PE) is negative when the bank lends. Thus, any factor
that reduces the value of a TE and/or PE and/or reduces the likelihood of bank lending will
make shutdown more likely. For example, shutdown is more likely when the human capital
of any player deteriorates and when the liquidity constraint worsens. Larger perks of either
the leader or the bank also reduce the chance of shutdown.
The eﬀect of bank incentives is ambiguous. When the bank’s expected proﬁt from
lending is negative, increasing the proﬁt incentives of the bank will make lending less likely
and shutdown more likely. However, when the bank’s expected proﬁt from lending (to either
a TE or a PE or both) is positive, increasing the proﬁt incentives of the bank will make
lending more likely and shutdown less likely. Thus, the sign of this eﬀect depends on the
sign of the bank’s expected proﬁt from lending.
The eﬀect of the leader’s budget constraint is also ambiguous. On the one hand, an
increase in the hardness of the budget constraint will reduce the proﬁtability of a TE and
thus make shutdown more likely. On the other hand, an increase in the hardness of the
budget will make the bank’s lending to a TE more proﬁtable and make it more willing to
lend, thereby reducing the probability of a shutdown.
Hypothesis 2: The likelihood of shutdown increases with the bank’s liquidity constraint; it
15decreases with the ﬁrm’s proﬁtability, the leader’s human capital, the manager’s human cap-
ital, the bank’s human capital, the leader’s perks and the bank’s perks; it may increase or
decrease with the leader’s budget constraint and the bank’s proﬁt incentive.
4 Data
We start this section by introducing our survey and data. We then describe the patterns
of privatization, in particular the heterogeneity across townships. Since several papers have
described privatization using the same data (see Li, (2003), Li and Rozelle (2003; 2004)), we
only summarize the key features here.
4.1 The Survey
There are not national data tracking the ownership changes that occurred in township en-
terprises over the 1990s. In order to analyze enterprise privatization, the authors and their
Chinese colleagues carried out an extensive survey covering 59 townships drawn from 15
counties in the two provinces of Jiangsu and Zhejiang in 1998 and 2000. The selection of the
counties and townships was designed to ensure a representative cross-section of the region.
After stratifying all of the counties in each province into three income groups, we selected
eight counties in each province. Within each county, we chose four townships also by strat-
ifying on the basis of income. Administrative problems prevented the completion of the
survey in one of the counties in Zhejiang, thus giving us data on 15 rather than 16 counties.
Data were incomplete for three of the townships so that the total number of townships on
which we have information is 57.
The survey consisted of four parts: 1) a census of all ﬁrms that were township-owned
as of 1993 in order to track changes in ownership and key enterprise aggregates, e.g. output,
employment, proﬁts and assets, in these ﬁrms up through 1999; 2) an in-depth survey of three
randomly selected enterprises in each township that collected detailed balance sheet data,
bank loan history, and information on the privatization process (if the ﬁrm was privatized);
163) a survey of the local branches of ABC and RCCs that provided detailed information on
bank behavior, including balance sheet data, as well as bank loan information on the three
randomly selected ﬁrms; and 4) a survey of township leaders that provided data on cadre
personnel, the local government, and the township economy.
In this paper, we utilize the census data, in combination with the bank branch man-
ager and township leader surveys.7 Altogether, we have information on ownership changes
between 1993 and 1997 for a total of 643 township-owned ﬁrms, and for the period between
1993 and 1999, we have data on 390 ﬁrms. In the empirical work below, we primarily draw
on the larger, but shorter sample of ﬁrms that goes through 1997. We do this for several
reasons. First, it maximizes our sample size. Second, our ability to resurvey in townships in
2000 appears to be non-random, suggesting potential biases in analysis using the longer, but
smaller data set.8 And third, we are interested in how “initial” conditions, especially those
in the ﬁnancial institutions, inﬂuenced township government decisions once privatization
became legal. To reduce the complications that arise because initial conditions may have
changed over a longer period, we choose to use the data for the shorter period.
4.2 Privatization in Rural China
Changes in ownership took several forms. In a majority of cases, it entailed selling the
entire ﬁrm to either a single individual or a group of individuals. In all but a few cases,
the ﬁrm was sold to the incumbent manager. In other cases, however, only part of the ﬁrm
was sold, and the township retained either a majority or minority position. This typically
occurred as part of a process of converting the company to a joint-stock or share-holding
company. In some cases, share-holding companies were subsequently completely privatized
with the township’s divesture of their remaining shares. Correspondingly, we utilize several
alternative deﬁnitions of privatization. Our strictest deﬁnition, P1, deﬁnes as privatized only
those ﬁrms in which 100 percent of the ﬁrm was sold. P2 adds to the list those ﬁrms in which
a majority of shares (50 percent or more) were private, with the remaining shares retained by
17the township government. Finally, P3 includes as private those ﬁrms with minority private
shares.
Several features of these data are noteworthy. First, over the period between 1993 and
1997, privatization was pervasive. As shown by Table 1, altogether, 220 out of our sample of
643 ﬁrms, or 34.2 percent of ﬁrms, were fully privatized by 1997.9 This consists of 210 ﬁrms
that were fully privatized through a single sale, plus 10 more ﬁrms that were ﬁrst converted
into shareholding companies in which the township retained equity, and then became fully
private when the township sold-oﬀ their remaining shares. If we also include as private
those ﬁrms in which the township only had a minority position, then 290 out of 643, or 45.1
percent were privatized.10
Second, there is a marked increase over time in the rate of privatization activity, which
peaked in 1998. This is true both in terms of the absolute number of ﬁrms aﬀected, as well
as in terms of the percentage of existing TEs privatized in a given year. Privatization began
in earnest in 1993, with 11 townships starting that year (Table 2). From beginning to end,
the length of time involved in the process was slightly more than two years, with a majority
of townships reporting being completed in 1998. In 1996 and 1997, the rate of privatization
nearly doubled that experienced between 1993 and 1995. The rate again doubled in 1998,
before declining signiﬁcantly in 1999.
Third, although provincial-level diﬀerences are modest, there is considerable hetero-
geneity across townships in privatization rates (Table 3). For example, in 10 out of the 57
townships (or 17.5 percent of all townships) less than 20 percent of all TEs were privatized
by 1997. In 14 out of the 57 (or 24.6 percent of all townships), on the other hand, between
60 and 80 percent of all TEs were privatized by 1997.
And fourth, a signiﬁcant number of ﬁrms in the survey were shut down. For the sample
of 643 ﬁrms, 15.4 percent went out of operation by 1997. To put this in perspective, this
is twice the number of ﬁrms in the same townships that went out of operation between
1980 and 1993. The high rate of shutdown eﬀectively lowered (raised) the percentage of
18government-controlled (private) ﬁrms in operation at the end of the period.
4.3 Explanatory Variables
The explanatory variables, or the potential determinants of privatization and shutdown, are
organized into several groups: Firm attributes, human capital variables, budget hardness,
and bank attributes. We describe each of them below. Summary information for each of
these variables is provided in Table 4. Unless we note otherwise, information is reported for
1994, or before most privatization activities began in our sample.
We use two ﬁrm attributes as independent variables. Since the rent a township leader
derives from a TE is positively related to ﬁrm size, we use ﬁrm size, or employment in this
context to measure rent.11 The other ﬁrm attribute we use is the proﬁt rate, which is deﬁned
as proﬁts divided by ﬁrm sales in the initial year 1994. Ideally, we would like the proﬁt rate
to measure only the ex ante likelihood of project success (or proﬁtability), which is π in the
model. However, since proﬁtability is also correlated with ﬁrm rent, which we do not model
in the theory, the proﬁt rate may also pick up part of the eﬀect of rents in a TE even after
we control for ﬁrm employment.
Variables that measure the human capital of bank managers and township leaders are
their age, years of education and origin. Unfortunately, we do not observe the human capital
of ﬁrm mangers for the census data we use. While age (measuring experience) and education
are related to their general human capital, the origin variable (1 if from the same township;
0 otherwise) measures location-speciﬁc human capital. However, the origin variables may
also pick up other eﬀects. For example, it may be that leaders (or bank managers) who
work in the same township as they grew up in are more likely to produce rents from the
privatization process because of long relationships in the community. These local leaders
may also have superior information about local ﬁrms, which reduces the information cost
in the process of privatization and thus makes privatization more likely to happen (Li and
Rozelle, 2004). Because there are two oﬀsetting eﬀects, it is an empirical issue whether the
19signs of the origin variables are positive or negative.
Our survey on the relationship between local governments and banks allows us to
measure the hardness of the leader’s budget constraint. The hardness is a qualitative variable
based on township level interviews with government oﬃcials who provided an answer to the
following question. ‘How diﬃcult is it to ask for an extension when a loan is overdue in
1994?’ We consider the budget constraint to be hard (equal to one) if the local government
oﬃcial cannot persuade the banks to give extensions on overdue loans to township enterprises
before liquidating them, and soft (equal to zero) otherwise.
Finally, the most important variables are measures of the bank’ incentives and liquidity
constraint. We use two variables to measure the bank manager’s proﬁt incentives, namely,
the weight on proﬁtability and the bonus-wage ratio, and also include the percentage of non-
performing loans to measure bank liquidity. The weight assigned to proﬁtability relative
to non-proﬁt duties (such as bank safety and party activities) by upper-level banks is an
index from one to ﬁve, with ﬁve the highest. The bonus ratio, on the other hand, represents
the manager’s bonus relative to the base wage if all branch targets are fulﬁlled. Since both
measures are ex ante measures, and are determined by higher level authorities, they are
exogenous in our setup. On average, the bonus was equal to two-thirds of the base wage, or
roughly forty percent of total compensation. We utilize information on the non-performing
component of the bank’s loan portfolio to capture bank liquidity. More speciﬁcally, we use
the percentage of the bank loan portfolio that is overdue as the measure of the percentage of
non-performing loans, with larger percentage indicating more serious liquidity constraint.12
5 Empirical Results
We are interested in the decision of local governments either to continue to operate TEs,
privatize them, or shut them down. We use P1 or complete privatization as our deﬁnition
of privatization, and use the 1994 information to explain privatization and shutdown that
happened between 1994 and 1997. Although we have observations for most of the explanatory
20variables for either both 1994 and 1997, or for the whole time series, we only use the initial
year (1994) information to avoid potential simultaneity.13
Because the three choices, i.e., privatization, shutdown and remaining a TE, are un-
ordered, it is natural to use the multinomial logit model. In the estimation, we use “continue
to operate as a TE” as our base category, and report coeﬃcients that have a linear eﬀect
on the log of the “odds ratio”. The odds ratio is also known as the relative risk ratio. The
odds ratio measures how likely privatization or shutdown is relative to the base category,
i.e., remaining a TE. In the multinomial logit model, the log of the odds ratio is a linear
function of the independent variables.
5.1 Determinants of Privatization
The ﬁrst two columns of Table 5 report results of our baseline model, in which we include
ﬁrm proﬁtability, the number of employees in the ﬁrm, bank liquidity, the bank manager’s
incentives, the hardness of the leader’s budget constraint, and bank manager and township
leader attributes. In Model (2) reported as columns 3 and 4, we include interactions between
the hardness of the budget constraint and bank liquidity, and between budget hardness and
the weight on proﬁtability in the bank’s targets. Due to missing values of many independent
variables, we have only 338 ﬁrms in the ﬁnal sample for regressions.
5.1.1 Leader and Firm Attributes
We ﬁnd considerable empirical support for Hypothesis 1, which concerns the determinants of
privatization. First, the likelihood of privatization relative to remaining a TE increases with
the hardness of the budget constraint. The variable hardness has a positive coeﬃcient, and
it is signiﬁcant at the one percent level. Harder budget constraints eﬀectively increase the
liability of the local government in the event of project failure by the TE, and thus reduce
the attractiveness of retaining government ownership.14
Second, privatization is signiﬁcantly linked to the attributes of both the township leader
as our model predicts. We ﬁnd that the likelihood of privatization is lower in townships where
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reﬂects the fact that leaders with better human capital have a lower cost in the management
and oversight of TEs, and thus have a larger value in retaining them. We also ﬁnd that
privatization is more likely if the leader is from the local township. One possibility is that
leaders with long ties to the community are able to extract side-payments in the course of
privatization.
Finally, privatization is less likely when the leader’s perks associated with a TE are
larger. Our ﬁrst measure of the size of perks is the size of the ﬁrm as captured by total em-
ployment, which as expected has a negative and signiﬁcant coeﬃcient. The second measure,
the ﬁrm’s proﬁt rate, is a more complicated measure. The impact of ﬁrm proﬁtability on
privatization is ambiguous because of two oﬀsetting eﬀects. On the one hand, our model pre-
dicts a positive eﬀect of proﬁtability because higher proﬁtability (π in the model) increases
the value of a PE more than that of a TE. Potentially oﬀsetting this is the fact that rents
or perks from government ownership will be positively correlated with ﬁrm proﬁtability. We
ﬁnd that the ﬁrm proﬁt rate has a negative sign, which suggests that proﬁtability is more
likely picking up the eﬀect of perks to local leaders on privatization decisions. This ﬁnding
is in sharp contrast with much of the experience in Eastern Europe, where more proﬁtable
ﬁrms in fact were the ﬁrst to be privatized (Gupta et. al., 2001).
5.1.2 Bank Attributes
More important in this study, we ﬁnd that the likelihood of privatization is related to bank
attributes, such as the human capital and incentives of bank managers and the capacity of
the bank to lend, in the way our model predicts. First, in terms of the bank manager’s
human capital, we ﬁnd that the likelihood of privatization is positively related to the human
capital of the bank manager. This is consistent with our model and the view that bank
manager’s human capital has a larger impact on private ﬁrms than TEs because of the
agency problems in a TE. A related interpretation for this link between bank manager
human capital and privatization is that “relationship-lending” and the rents from lending
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make lending decisions strictly on the basis of project proﬁtability, these bank managers are
more likely to be inﬂuenced by the potential rents via the local government from lending to
TEs.
Second, consistent with Hypothesis 1, regression results show that ﬁrms are more likely
to be privatized in townships where the evaluation of bank managers’ performance gives more
weight to proﬁtability and when managers have stronger incentives (Table 5, column 1). Both
the weight given to proﬁts in managerial evaluation and the manager’s incentives (measured
by the manager’s bonus to the base wage ratio) have a positive and signiﬁcant eﬀect on
privatization. When bank managers are given greater proﬁt incentives by higher-level bank
authorities, they are more inclined to lend to PEs versus TEs, thereby increasing the value
of a PE relative to a TE.
Third, we ﬁnd that bank liquidity is important in exerting pressure on township leaders
to privatize. Reductions in bank liquidity, as captured by an increase in the ratio of non-
performing loans to the bank’s total loan portfolio, signiﬁcantly increase the likelihood that
the ﬁrm will be privatized. The liquidity constraint reduces the likelihood that TEs will be
able to access bank ﬁnance relative to PEs, because TEs generally have lower proﬁtability.
Thus, the bank liquidity constraint makes it harder for a TE to remain in operation.
Finally, our econometric model identiﬁes important interaction eﬀects involving budget
hardness with bank attributes. Although more powerful bank incentives or more serious
liquidity constraints make the bank less willing to lend to an unproﬁtable TE, a harder
government budget constraint reduces the loss of the bank in the case of default and therefore
increases the proﬁtability of lending to a TE. This weakens the negative eﬀect of bank
incentives and liquidity constraint on the bank’s lending to a TE, and implies that the eﬀects
of bank incentives and liquidity constraint on privatization should decrease in the hardness
of the leader’s budget constraint. We test this prediction by including two interaction terms,
one for incentives with budget hardness and the other for the liquidity constraint with the
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however, only the interaction with bank liquidity is signiﬁcant. With the inclusion of these
interaction terms, the coeﬃcients on budget hardness, the bank manager incentives, and the
liquidity constraints remain the same signs.
5.1.3 Alternative Deﬁnitions of Privatization
Table 5 is based on a deﬁnition of privatization that only includes ﬁrms that are fully priva-
tized. We examine the robustness of our results by extending our deﬁnition to include those
ﬁrms in which the township retained either minority (P2) or majority ownership (P3), or
an additional 70 and 33 ﬁrms respectively. The role of the attributes of ﬁnancial institu-
tions remains signiﬁcant in explaining privatization, however ﬁrm-level attributes (size and
proﬁtability) lose explanatory power, especially with the inclusion of P3.
5.2 Determinants of Shutdown
In columns 2 and 4 of Table 5 we report regressions examining the choice between shutdown
and remaining in operation as a TE. According to Hypothesis 2, the likelihood of shutdown
increases with the bank’s liquidity constraint; it decreases with the ﬁrm’s proﬁtability, the
leader’s human capital, the manager’s human capital, the bank’s human capital, the leader’s
perks and the bank’s perks; it is ambiguous with respect to the leader’s budget constraint
and the bank’s proﬁt incentive.
In general, the results are much weaker than we ﬁnd for the decision to privatize versus
remaining a TE, but several variables are suggestive. First, consistent with Hypothesis 2,
the bank liquidity constraint has a signiﬁcant positive eﬀect on the likelihood that a ﬁrm is
shut down. Clearly, in townships in which banks are handicapped in their ability to continue
to lend to TEs, local leaders ﬁnd it more diﬃcult to continue to run these ﬁrms, and they
are much more likely to be forced to shut down. Second, ﬁrm size and proﬁtability have
the expected negative signs, though their eﬀects are statistically insigniﬁcant. Third, the
ﬁndings regarding the human capital variables are mixed. On the one hand, all the human
24capital variables of the bank manager have positive coeﬃcients (though most of them are
not signiﬁcant), which contradicts Hypothesis 2. On the other hand, all the human capital
variables of the leader have the expected negative sign, and are typically signiﬁcant. All else
equal, more able leaders are less likely to shut ﬁrms down in their townships. Finally, we
ﬁnd that the weight on proﬁtability and the bank manager’s proﬁt incentives have negative
eﬀects on shutdown. As suggested by our theory, this could happen when lending to TEs
is proﬁtable, because in that case larger incentives will make a TE more valuable and less
likely for leaders to shut down.
6 Conclusions
Government ownership confers a variety of beneﬁts and perks on governments and their
leaders. These beneﬁts, however, are not determined in isolation, but rather depend crucially
on the interaction between governments, ﬁnancial institutions, and enterprise managers.
Starting from this basic premise, in this paper we examine the decision of local governments
in China to privatize township-owned ﬁrms in light of changes in these relationships. Our
simple theory highlights not only how the government leader may voluntarily choose to
privatize their ﬁrms when the environments in which they operate these ﬁrms change, but
also how leaders are forced to privatize by local banks that have good proﬁt incentives or
face serious liquidity constraint. Drawing on unique data we collected from Jiangsu and
Zhejiang provinces, we ﬁnd evidence supporting the predictions of our theory.
Our study demonstrates an important linkage between changes in the ﬁnancial sector
and privatization decisions. In part, the fast growth of TVEs in the 1980s and early 1990s was
due to the rapid credit expansion of banks operating under poor managerial incentives. One
consequence of this expansion was the signiﬁcant accumulation of non-performing loans. This
same accumulation of non-performing loans also underlay bank reform. The privatization of
TVEs we document for the 1990s is a response to a combination of improved bank incentives
and worsening bank liquidity. In this sense, our work nicely illustrates how reform in one
25sector, in this case the ﬁnancial sector, can spur reform in others, notably, the enterprise
sector.
Given the important role of ﬁnancial institutions in the privatization process, in fu-
ture work we plan to examine how these same institutions are inﬂuencing the returns to
privatization. In addition to being a potential source of selection eﬀects in the privatization
process, banks can also aﬀect ﬁrm performance through their willingness to lend and their
monitoring role.
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Better bank incentives. Privatization is more likely when banks have better incentives. With
higher γ, banks are more likely to lend (
dWi
dγ > 0) if projects are proﬁtable [eiR + (1 −




dγ . This is due to the fact
that γ leads to a greater return to the extra eﬀort put in by a private ﬁrm, making that a
more advantageous ownership form.
Note as well that it is possible that higher γ increases the willingness to lend to private
ﬁrms and reduce the bank’s willingness to lend to TEs. This will arise when ePER + (1 −
ePE)[δPER − (1 − δPE)f(R,l)] > 0 > eTER + (1 − eTE)[δTER − (1 − δTE)f(R,l)], which
implies
dWPE
dγ > 0 >
dWTE
dγ . The diﬀerence in these responses diminishes as δTE rises and as
g rises (and therefore the cost of monitoring falls).
Increasing the Probability of Payment in the Default State. Conditional on receiving a loan,
increasing δTE will reduce expected proﬁt of the ﬁrm by increasing its potential losses. This
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Importance of Relationships. If relationships become more important to either the bank
manager or the leader (increasing αB or αL), privatization is less appealing.
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[VP − VTE] = ePE − eTE > 0
27Therefore, under private ownership ﬁrms realize this level of proﬁts more often. So, increasing
π has a larger impact on the value of private ﬁrms.
The eﬀect of liquidity. When the bank has many bad loans, it is very costly (perhaps
prohibitively diﬃcult) to lend for new projects. Without further ﬁnancing, ﬁrms cannot be
retained. Higher l reduces the likelihood banks will lend. This eﬀect is larger for TEs, which
have a lower probability of being proﬁtable.
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The eﬀect of liquidity on the ability of banks to lend depends on δTE, and γ. With larger
δTE, bad loans are less important since the probability of default is lower. With higher γ,







Firm and bank managers’ human capital. Increasing the manager’s human capital increases
the value of both ownership structures, since it makes it less costly to induce eﬀort, which
increases the probability of project success. If the marginal cost of eﬀort is falling in the
manager’s human capital, this eﬀect will be larger in private ﬁrms since they undertake
higher eﬀort levels. As a consequence, privatization will be more likely. d
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Leader’s human capital. Increasing the leader’s human capital makes it less costly to monitor
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1Throughout the paper, we will use the term leader and local government interchange-
ably.
2There is a related literature on bank privatizations (see, for example, Clarke and Cull
2000 and 2002). Here we focus on the role of bank behaviour in ﬁrm privatization decisions.
3The ABC is one of four specialized state-owned banks and is responsible for lending to
support agriculture and rural development. Oﬃcially, the RCCs are autonomous, collective-
run local institutions, but up through the early 1990s were usually supervised by local ABC
branches. However, in 1994 supervision of the RCCs shifted to China’s central bank, The
People’s Bank of China (PBC), and the separation between the RCCs and ABCs became
more distinct.
4This monitoring contract will dominate incentive contracts (with a minimal wage of
zero in the default state) if dC
de − ¯ w > C(H,h,e) + M(g,e), for all e. This minimal wage
restriction prevents the leader from eﬀectively ‘selling’ the manager residual control rights
to the ﬁrm and thereby inducing optimal eﬀort. This restriction seems natural within the
context of managerial contracts, especially since our focus is on ‘real’ privatizations.
5The manager may also enjoy perks from private ﬁrms, but probably of a lesser magni-
tude. So, we restrict ourselves to perks only from relationships with TEs. Therefore, αB > 0
for TEs and αB = 0 for private ﬁrms.
6For simplicity, we restricted the bank to only choose whether or not to lend, but not
how much to lend. As a consequence, in case (1) in which the bank is willing to lend to
29either ownership form, bank attributes do not aﬀect the privatization decision. In a more
general model, where the bank could choose the degree of its involvement, these variables
might appear in the privatization decision.
7Li (2003) utilizes the random survey of 168 ﬁrms (3 per township) to examine how
market competition and budget hardness aﬀect privatization. Brandt and Li (2003) use the
“matching” ﬁrm-bank data covering the same number of ﬁrms to investigate discrimination
against private ﬁrms.
8A comparison of the two data sets reveals that townships in which we encountered
administrative diﬃculty in resurveying in 2000 had higher than average privatization rates up
through 1997. As a result, the 2000 sample of townships is under-represented by townships
that privatized earlier, and more extensively.
9The trend for the smaller sample that runs through 1999 is similar. In that sample,
208 out of 390 ﬁrms, or 53.3 percent of ﬁrms, were fully privatized, and 64.9 percent were
at least partially privatized by 1999.
10We do not report these data in the table, but they are contained in an earlier work-
ing paper available at: http://www.bus.umich.edu/KresgeLibrary/Collections/ Workingpa-
pers/wdi/wp429.pdf
11We also experimented with total sales or ﬁxed asset levels, which have a similar eﬀect.
Since these variables are highly correlated, we use only employment in this paper.
12Non-performing loans in China were divided in the early 1990s into three basic types:
dead, inactive, and overdue. The balance sheet information we collected from the RCC and
ABC branches included estimates of the stock of overdue loans, however, we collected much
less information on loans classiﬁed as inactive and dead. Therefore, in the empirical work,
we use the percentage of the portfolio that is overdue as the liquidity constraint measure in
order to maximize our sample. In general, results using overdue plus inactive on a smaller
sample are consistent.
13For example, proﬁt and employment could be endogenous. Firms could lay oﬀ work-
30ers before privatization, while managers may have incentives to reduce proﬁt just prior to
privatization in order to lower the price they pay. Li (2003) provides one way to partially
address this concern, which is to use the initial year (1994) information to explain privati-
zation that happened a few years later, so that the 1994 information will not pick up the
pre-privatization activities such as layoﬀs. We experimented with this method by using 1994
information to explain privatization that happened in 1995-1997 or even in 1996-1997, and
ﬁnd that the results do not change much.
14A case can be made that the hardness of the budget is endogenous, and that govern-
ments may privatize to harden the budget constraint. We do not believe that this is an issue
here because budget hardness is being measured prior to the year in which privatization
became legal. Using a subset of our sample, Li (2003) shows that the hardness of the budget
is exogenous in this context.
15We experimented including interactions between budget hardness and the manager’s
bonus, but multicollinearity prevents us from identifying the eﬀects of all six variables, i.e.,
manager bonus, weight on proﬁtability, bank liquidity, budget hardness, and budget hardness
interacted with the ﬁrst three variables.
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Table 1: Distribution of Firms Privatized and Shut Down by Year (1993-1997) 
         
Year  Number of TEs at the 









         
         
1993 643  15  2.3     
         
1994 628  29  4.6  4  0.1 
         
1995 595  46  7.7  28  4.7 
         
1996 521  57  10.9  26  4.9 
         
1997 438  73  16.7  41  9.4 
         
1998  324       
         
Total 643  220  34.2  99  15.4 
         
         
         
Note: We use P1, or complete privatization, to derive numbers of firms privatized. The percentage privatized and 
shutdown are calculated relative to the number of TEs in operation at the beginning of the year. 
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Table 2: Distribution of Townships by Year Privatization Started and Completed (Number of Townships) 
        
Year  Number of townships  
started privatization in that year 
    Number of townships  
Completed privatization in that year 
        
        
1992 4      0 
        
1993 11      2 
        
1994 7      1 
        
1995 6      1 
        
1996 15      6 
        
1997 14      6 
        
1998 0      32 
        
1999 0      3 
        
Total 57      51 
        
        
Note: We do not have information on the year privatization completed for six of the 57 townships in our sample. 
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Table 3: Distribution of the Pace of Privatization at the Township Level among Townships in China, 1994 to 1997 
  




Number of Townships 
 
Percentage 
    
0-20 10  18 
21-40 9  16 
41-60 17  30 
61-80 14  24 
81-100 7  12 
    
Total 57  100 
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Firm attributes in 1994    
    Employment  164.3  402.5 
    Profit rate (profit/sales)  -0.01  0.54 
    
The hardness of the leader’s budget constraint  0.50 0.50 
    
Bank attributes in 1994    
  Weight on profitability (=1, 2, 3, 4 and 5, 
                                  weight increases with value) 
3.78 0.75 
   Manager’s bonus-wage ratio  0.66  0.26 
   Percentage of non-performing loans  21.1  18.5 
    
Bank manager’s human capital in 1994    
    Education  12.32  1.33 
    Age  39.94  5.05 
    Origin (1 if from the same township; 0 otherwise)  0.39  0.31 
    
Leader’s human capital in 1994    
    Education  13.28  1.74 
    Age  43.03  4.53 
    Origin (1 if from the same township; 0 otherwise)  0.23  0.42 
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Bank attributes in 1994         
   Weight on profitability (=1, 2, 3, 4 and 5, 

































         
Bank manager’s human capital in 1994         
























         
Leader’s human capital in 1994         
























         
Pseudo R-squared  0.19    0.20 
Pseudo Log likihod  -242.06    -236.61 
Observations  338    338 
          
          
Notes: Numbers in parentheses are standard errors.  Significance levels of 0.1, 0.05 and 0.01 are noted by ***, **, 
and *. 
 